For a (im)possíble theory of justice in Republic book I

Abstract

Our aim in these article is to present Kerferd´s view about theory of justice defended by Thrasymachus in Republic, book I. In his article, The doctrine of Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, Kerferd lists four theses (nihilism, legalism, natural law and psychological egoism), refutes three of them, supporting the position of natural law. Kerferd, in his argumentation, puts thrasymachus closer to Callicles, Socrates' interlocutor in the Gorgias dialogue, afirming that both thesis are similar. In our argumentations, we point possibles problems in Kerferd's position and also a inconsistency in defending a theory of justice by the sophist, which is just a personification of the vision of his time, which must be refuted for its support on other bases.