Desacordo e ceticismo sobre o critério da verdade em Sexto Empírico

Abstract

One of the main questions in pyrrhonian skepticism is the discussion about the problem of criterion. Is there a truth criterion? In other words, is there a criterion that allow us to know true the nature of things? For Sextus Empiricus, the proper disagreement between philosophers about this question bring us to the skepticism because there are multiple opinions about the topic. In addition, there are counter arguments opposing everything the dogmatic philosophers affirm to be the criterion. For the pyrrhonian skepticism, therefore, in a way or another we will end in suspension of judgment about the criterion of the truth. In this article, at first place I will present an overview about the disagreement concerning the criterion of truth. Then, I will present a general skeptic argument based in the impossibility of solving this dispute. Ultimately, I will discuss a series of specific arguments against each one of dogmatic thesis about the criterion. For Sextus Empiricus, opposing these dogmatic arguments take us one more time to the skepticism. Thus, in a way or another we should suspend the judgment about the criterion of truth.